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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           
No. 08-3266
                           
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
HARRY QUIAH, Appellant
                           
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District Court of New Jersey
District Court  No. 2-08-cr-00087-001
District Judge: The Honorable Jose L. Linares
                              
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 26, 2009
Before: BARRY, SMITH, Circuit Judges
and DuBOIS, District Judge*
(Filed: July 8, 2009)
                             
OPINION
                             
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Harry Quiah challenges his term of imprisonment on several grounds. 
1In his statement of facts, Quiah contends that his plea agreement contained a
stipulation to an offense level of twenty-nine.  Before this Court, however, Quiah has not
argued that the District Court erroneously calculated his offense level of thirty-one or
otherwise erred in the calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range.  
2The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and this Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)
2
Between August and September 2006, Quiah participated in two drug transactions
involving cocaine base, also known as crack cocaine, and the sale of three weapons with
ammunition.  The Government charged Quiah with one count of possession with intent to
distribute five grams or more of crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition after having
been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year imprisonment, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Quiah pleaded guilty to the charges, pursuant to a plea agreement,
on January 25, 2008.
  Quiah was sentenced on July 28, 2008.  The District Court calculated his offense
level as thirty-one1 and his criminal history category as category II.  The Sentencing
Guideline range for individuals with this offense level and criminal history category is
121 to 151 months.  After hearing argument for downward departures and variances, the
District Court sentenced Quiah to a 120-month term of imprisonment.  
Quiah contends the District Court erred in several regards when it sentenced him.2 
First, he argues that the disparity between sentences for those convicted of cocaine base
and cocaine powder violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.  In Chapman v.
3United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991), the Supreme Court indicated that a due process
challenge to a criminal punishment authorized by statute “essentially duplicates” an equal
protection challenge.  Id. at 465.  And this Court has repeatedly held that the disparity
between sentencing for cocaine base and cocaine powder does not violate equal
protection.  See United States v. Alton, 60 F.3d 1065, 1069–70 (3d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1992).  Accordingly, there is no merit to
Quiah’s Fifth Amendment claim.
Though Quiah’s constitutional challenge lacks merit, he also argues that the
District Court should have applied the factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to address
the sentencing disparity between cocaine base and cocaine powder.  This Court has
“made clear that district courts [are] ‘under no obligation to impose a sentence below the
applicable Guidelines range solely on the basis of the crack/powder cocaine differential,’”
though a court would err if it failed to recognize that it could consider this differential as
part of its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207,
222 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 249 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
As Quiah did not raise the disparity during the sentencing hearing before the District
Court, the issue is waived.  See United States v. King, 518 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 2008) (“At
no time prior to this appeal did King raise the issue of the disparity created by the 100:1
crack to powder cocaine quantity ratio. Nor did King ask the district court to consider the
disparity in determining his sentence. Thus, King cannot argue on appeal the district court
erred by failing to consider that factor.”); United States v. Filipiak, 466 F.3d 582, 584 (7th
3Quiah also argues his sentence is unreasonable because “the District Court
appeared to agree with the parties that a level 29 was appropriate.”  Because the
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Cir.2006) (stating that “a defendant cannot complain on appeal that [his] sentence should
have been reduced based upon § 3553(a) factors that were never brought to the attention
of the district court”).  
Next, Quiah asserts that the District Court did not adequately explain the chosen
sentence.  While he acknowledges that the District Court calculated the Guideline range,
ruled on motions for departure, addressed the § 3553(a) factors, and acknowledged the
advisory nature of the Guidelines, Quiah argues that the District Court failed to
“sufficiently explain on the record or in the Judgment the exact Offense Level or the
Criminal History Category” under which it sentenced Quiah.  He further argues that this
failure prevents meaningful appellate review.  This argument is belied by the record,
which is more than sufficient to enable our review.  Despite arguments from Quiah’s
counsel that it should calculate the sentencing range based on an offense level of twenty-
nine, the District Court rejected this argument and stated at least three times that it
believed the appropriate offense level was thirty-one.  Thus, because the District Court
explained the Guidelines calculation and noted that it resulted in a sentencing range of
121–151 months, it is clear that the District Court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence
of 120 months.  
Finally, Quiah argues that his sentence is unreasonable because various § 3553(a)
factors warranted a reduced sentence.3  This Court reviews a district court’s sentence for
sentencing range for an individual with an offense level of twenty-nine and criminal
history category of II is 97-121 months, Quiah argues that his 120-month term of
imprisonment is unreasonable because it does not reflect the District Court’s “favorable
reaction” to his § 3553(a) arguments.  This argument fails for the reason stated
above—the District Court clearly rejected Quiah’s efforts to calculate his sentencing
range on the basis of an offense level of twenty-nine.  
5
procedural and substantive reasonableness.  United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195
(3d Cir. 2008).  In doing so, we apply the “abuse of discretion” standard.  Wise, 515 F.3d
at 217–18.  Before this Court, Quiah recognized that he “received a sentence that is
arguably consistent with a strict application of the Guidelines.”  This weighs in favor of
his sentence’s procedural and substantive reasonableness.  See Gall v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007) (“[W]hen a district judge’s discretionary decision in a particular
case accords with the sentence the United States Sentencing Commission deems
appropriate ‘in the mine run of cases,’ the court of appeals may presume that the sentence
is reasonable.”).  
In United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2006), this Court stated that “a
rote statement of the § 3553(a) factors should not suffice if at sentencing either the
defendant or the prosecution properly raises ‘a ground of recognized legal merit.’” Id. at
329 (citation omitted).  Nonetheless, the “court need not discuss every argument made by
a litigant,” nor must it “discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors.” 
Id.  Applying a deferential standard of review, this Court instead looks to whether the §
3553(a) factors “were reasonably applied to the circumstances of the case” and whether
“the district judge imposed the sentence . . . for reasons that are logical and consistent
6with the factors set forth in section 3553(a).”  Id. at 330. 
Before the District Court, Quiah’s counsel argued for a below-guideline sentence
on the grounds that: (1) Quiah and the Government had agreed in a draft plea agreement
to an offense level of twenty-nine; (2) Quiah cooperated with the Government; (3) Quiah
faced harsh pre-sentence detainment conditions; and (4) Quiah will face harsher
confinement conditions, such as ineligibility for drug abuse programs, because of his
status as an immigrant.  The District Court sufficiently considered these issues.  In fact, it
discussed each one and concluded that, while the issues did not warrant a downward
departure, they did “resonate with the Court in making a determination as to the [§] 3553
factors.”  The Court balanced these arguments, however, against the seriousness and
dangerousness of the crimes charged and concluded that a 120-month term of
imprisonment was appropriate.  Because the Court considered each of the issues raised by
Quiah, we believe that the District Court’s imposition of a 120-month term of
imprisonment was not procedurally unreasonable.
Furthermore, Quiah’s term of imprisonment was not substantively unreasonable. 
“[I]f the district court’s sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d
558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  The District Court concluded that a 120-month term
of imprisonment was reasonable, and we agree.  
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s decision.  
